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SUPREME COURT
WESTCHESTER COUNTY

Elite Funding Corp. v. Mid-Hudson Better Business Bureau50 8
(decided March 31, 1995)
Plaintiff, Elite Funding Corp. [hereinafter "Elite"], a mortgage

brokerage, sought damages from Mid-Hudson Better Business
Bureau [hereinafter "the Bureau"], to recover for defamation
resulting from the Bureau's statement that the plaintiff had an

"unsatisfactory" consumer rating. 509 In its defense, the Bureau

claimed that the rating was an expression of opinion based upon

the stated facts. 5 10 As a result, it was not actionable because it
was protected by the privilege of "fair comment" under both the
New York State 5 11 and Federal 5 12 Constitutions. 5 13 The court

concluded that the Bureau's rating was constitutionally protected
speech and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment
5 14
dismissing the complaint.

The Bureau received six consumer complaints regarding the
plaintiff and its operations. 5 15 In each instance, the Bureau
508. 165 Misc. 2d 497, 629 N.Y.S.2d 611 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1995).
509. Id. at 500, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
510. Id.
511. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. Article one, section eight, emphatically
commands: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall
be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Id.
512. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press...." Id.
513. Elite Funding Corp., 165 Misc. 2d at 502, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 615.
514. Id. at 503, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 615. The court held that the Bureau's
issuance of an unsatisfactory rating was not defamatory because it was true,
and even if the statement was not true the plaintiff failed to produce the
evidence of "express malice" required to prevail over the qualified "common
interest" privilege and the constitutional privilege of "fair comment." Id. at
501, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
515. Id. at 499-500, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 612-13. The Bureau is a not-for-profit
organization supported by businesses within the community. Id. at 497, 629
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notified Elite that a complaint had been filed against it.516
Subsequently, the Bureau made repeated attempts to contact Elite
in order to resolve each complaint. 517 Elite's failure to respond
to the Bureau's inquiries resulted in the Bureau closing each
complaint file with an indication that no response was ever
5 18
received.
On July 13, 1992, after closing the third no response file, the
Bureau sent a certified letter to Elite. 5 19 The letter stated that if
Elite failed to respond to the Bureau's inquiries by July 27, 1992,
the Bureau would issue them an "unsatisfactory" business
rating. 520 Elite failed to respond to this notice, and consequently
52 1
received an "unsatisfactory" rating from the Bureau.
Subsequently, two additional complaint files were closed
522
indicating no response.
In August of 1993, the Bureau advised Elite that it would
remove the "unsatisfactory" rating if Elite would either respond
to the five listed complaints or provide documentation that they
had been resolved. 523 Elite did not respond. 524 Subsequent to the
commencement of this action, the Bureau received a sixth
consumer complaint regarding Elite. 525 The Bureau again
attempted to illicit a response from Elite and was once again
526
unsuccessful.
The plaintiff the instituted this action, claiming that the Bureau
had "made numerous unfounded false and disparaging statements
of fact against the plaintiff." 527 Elite alleged that the statements
N.Y.S.2d at 612. The primary function of the Bureau is to resolve consumer
disputes through mediation. Id. at 497-98, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 612.
516. Id. at 499, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
517. Id.
518. Id.

519. Id.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 500, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
Id.
Id.

527. Id.
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made by the Bureau implied that Elite "was an 'unsatisfactory'
company with whom to do business and/or that Elite... had an
'unsatisfactory' rating with the defendant's organization" 528 and
that Elite was "incompetent and/or dishonest in its business
practices." 529 The plaintiff further alleged that the Bureau knew
the statements were false and made them with a gross and
reckless disregard for the truth. 530 Elite further maintained that
the statements caused the brokerage to suffer monetary
damages. 531
The Bureau argued that, based upon the plaintiff's history and
pattern of unresolved complaints, the "Bureau File Report"
contained an accurate statement of their opinion:
"unsatisfactory. "532 Moreover, the report specifically stated that
the Bureau "does not endorse, recommend, or disapprove of any
product, service or company. " 533 The Bureau also maintained

that they did not act with malice towards Elite. 534 It urged that
the "unsatisfactory" rating was based solely upon Elite's past
history with the Bureau, a history which consisted of numerous
consumer complaints to which Elite continually failed to
respond. 535 The Bureau maintained that the report was,
therefore, true. 5 3 6

The court concluded that the Bureau's allegedly defamatory
statements were true and granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment. 537 Moreover, the court stated that even if the
Bureau's statements were false, the Bureau would benefit from

528. Id.

529. Id.
530. Id.
531. Id.

532. Id.
533. Id.

534. Id.
535. Id.

536. Id.
537. Id. at 501, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 614 (stating that "[ilt is well settled that
truth is a complete defense to a claim of defamation").

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1996

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 3 [1996], Art. 36

990

TOURO LAW REVIEW

the attachment of both a qualified privilege 538
540
constitutional "fair comment" 5 3 9 privilege.

[Vol 12
and

a

538. Id. The New York Court of Appeals in discussing the qualified
privilege has stated:
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the
party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a
duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest
or duty, although it contained criminating matter which, without this
privilege, would be slanderous and actionable; and this though the duty
be not a legal one, but only a moral or social duty of imperfect
obligation. "The rule of law that permits such publications grew out of
the desirability in the public interest of encouraging a full and fair
statement by persons having a legal or moral duty to communicate their
knowledge and information about a person in whom they have an
interest to another who also has an interest in such person. Such
privilege is known as a 'qualified privilege.' It is qualified because it
does not extend beyond such statements as the writer makes in the
performance of such duty and in good faith believing them to be true."
When defendant's statements are presumptively privileged the rule is
that, in order to render them actionable, it is incumbent on the plaintiff
to prove that (they were) false and that the defendant was actuated by
express malice or actual ill will.
Shapiro v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., 7 N.Y.2d 56, 60, 163 N.E.2d
333, 335-36, 194 N.Y.S.2d 509, 512-13 (1959) (citations omitted).
539. Elite Funding Corp., 165 Misc. 2d at 501, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 614. The
"fair comment" privilege was derived from the need to "protect both the right
to comment on public affairs" and "the public's access to important
information." Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 266, 567
N.E.2d 1270, 1288, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, 924 (Titone, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991). Judge Titone further stated:
In furtherance of that concern, it is highly appropriate to consider the
context, tone and character of a statement challenged as defamatory
when determining whether it constitutes a privileged "fair comment" or
an actionable assertion of fact. Indeed, our common-law cases have
often included references to reading the challenged work 'as a whole'
and in their proper context.
Id. (Titone, J., concurring).
540. Elite Funding Corp., 165 Misc. 2d at 501, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 614. The
court also considered the implications of the Bureau's use of the qualified
"common interest" privilege. Id. "A communication is qualifiedly privileged
when it is fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private
duty upon any subject matter in which that person has an interest, and where it
is made to a person or persons with a corresponding interest or duty,"
Hollander v. Clayton, 145 A.D.2d 605, 606, 536 N.Y.S.2d 790, 792 (2d
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Prior to the Supreme Court decision in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,54 1 defamation cases had been decided on the basis of
the prevailing state common law. 542 In Sullivan, the Court

"injected

a constitutional

dimension"

into the issue of

defamation. 543

Moreover, the Court reaffirmed this principle in
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,544 holding that "a statement of
opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not
contain a probably false factual connotation will receive full
constitutional protection. "545

With respect to an analysis of speech using the test set out
under the Federal Constitution, the primary question is whether
the speech would "reasonably appear to state or imply assertions
of objective fact." 546 In making this determination, the courts
must consider not only the literal words used, 547 but also "the
impression created by the words used as well as the general tone
of the expression, from the point of view of the reasonable
person." 54 8 As a result of the Supreme Court's application of
these rules it may be said that an actionable statement may be
determined as follows: "except for special situations of loose,

Dep't 1988). In order to overcome these privileges, plaintiff must produce
evidence that the Bureau acted with "express malice" or "actual ill-will." Elite
Funding Corp., 165 Misc. 2d at 501, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
541. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
542. Gross v. New York Times, 82 N.Y.2d 146, 152, 623 N.E.2d 1163,
1166-67, 603 N.Y.S.2d 813, 816-17 (1993) (discussing the distinction between
"expressions of opinion which are not actionable, and assertions of fact, which
may form the basis of a viable libel claim"). See also Rappaport v. VV Pub.
Corp., 163 Misc. 2d 1, 8, 618 N.Y.S.2d 746, 750 (Sup. Ct. New York
County 1994) (noting that "[t]he New York State Constitution is decidedly
more protective of statements than its federal equivalent").
543. Gross, 82 N.Y.2d at 153, 623 N.E.2d at 1166, 603 N.Y.2d at 816.
544. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
545. Id. at 20. The court further noted that "speech earns no greater
protection simply because it is labeled 'opinion.'" Immuno A.G. v. MoorJankowsld, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 243, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1273, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906,
909, cert denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991).
546. Id.
547. Id.
548. Id. at 243, 57 N.E.2d at 1273-74, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
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figurative, hyperbolic language, statements that contain or imply
assertions of provably false fact will likely be actionable." 549
The Supreme Court, in establishing the standards for an
evaluation of the First Amendment protection of freedom of
speech, has set "only the minimum standards [to be] applicable
throughout the nation."550 Conversely, a state law analysis of
freedom of speech traditionally involves a combination of state
common law and state constitutional law. 55 1 The state courts are
charged with the responsibility of supplementing the federal
standards in order to "meet local needs and expectations." 552
The State of New York, with its reputation as a "cultural center
for the nation,"553 has a tradition of encouraging and protecting
the free expression of ideas. 554 This tradition was recognized and
protected in the "free speech guarantee of the New York State
Constitution," which was adopted in 1821. 555 The language of
this guarantee provides evidence of the State's desire to offer a
broader protection of speech "than the minimum required by the
Federal Constitution. "556
Regardless of whether a court is applying the New York or
Federal Constitution, the dispositive inquiry is whether a
statement can be reasonably interpreted as stating or implying
facts about the plaintiff, because only those statements which are
objectively provable as true "or false are actionable. 557 The New
York Court of Appeals has adopted a similar but "decidedly
more protective" view under the New York State Constitution. 558
In New York, the inquiry stated by the court of appeals requires
the court to determine:
549. Id. at 245, 57 N.E.2d at 1275, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
550. Id. at 248, 57 N.E.2d at 1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 913.

551. Id.
552. Id.
553. Id. at 249, 57 N.E.2d at 1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 913.

554. Id.
555. Id.
556. Id. at 249, 57 N.E.2d at 1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
557. Rappaport v. W Pub. Co., 163 Misc. 2d 1, 8, 618 N.Y.S.2d 746,
750 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1994).

558. Id.
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(1) whether the specific language in issue has a precise meaning
which is readily understood; (2) whether the statements are
capable of being proven true or false; and (3) whether either the
full context of the communication in which the statement appears
or the broader social context and surrounding circumstances are
such as to "signal ...readers or listeners that what is being read
559
or heard is likely to be opinion, not fact."

Despite this new trend in constitutional analysis, New York
continues to utilize the traditional common law categories for
actionable and non-actionable statements. 5 60 In all cases, the
court is obliged to consider the communication as a whole to
determine whether the reasonable listener or reader is likely to

understand the remark as an assertion of provable fact. 56 1 A
statement of opinion that implies a basis in fact is actionable
562
when those facts are not known or knowable to the audience.
Such statements may cause a reasonable listener to infer that the

speaker knows certain facts, unknown to the audience, which
support the opinion and are detrimental to the person toward
whom the statement is directed. 563 Conversely, a statement of
opinion that is accompanied by a recitation of the facts on which
559. Id. at 9, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 750 (citing Gross v. New York Times, 82
N.Y.2d 146, 153, 623 N.E.2d 1163, 1167, 603 N.Y.S.2d 813, 817).
560. Brian v. Richardson, 211 A.D.2d 413, 621 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49 (1st
Dep't 1995) (citing Gross, 82 N.Y.2d at 153-54, 623 N.E.2d at 1168, 603
N.Y.S.2d at 818). In Gross, where a former medical examiner brought an
action in defamation against the New York Times Co., the New York Court of
Appeals held that in determining if a statement is defamatory, there is a
distinction between an actionable and inactionable statement of opinion. Gross,
82 N.Y.2d at 153-54, 623 N.E.2d at 1168, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 818. In an
actionable statement of opinion, there is an implication that the opinion is
based on facts which are not disclosed to the reader. Id. In an inactionable
statement of opinion, there is an opinion accompanied by the disclosure of the
underlying facts. Id. Where there is an actionable statement of opinion, a
reasonable listener or reader may infer that the speaker knows facts which
support the opinion and these facts are detrimental to the subject. Id. However,
where there is an inactionable statement of opinion the hypothesis is
understood by the audience to be simply conjecture. Id.
561. Id. at 153, 622 N.E.2d at 1168, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
562. Id.
563. Id.
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it is based, or one that does not imply the existence of
undisclosed underlying facts, is not actionable because a
proffered hypothesis that is offered after a full recitation of the
facts on which it is based is readily understood by the audience as
5 64
conjecture.
The court in the current case concluded that because the

Bureau's "unsatisfactory" rating was a statement of opinion and
was based upon stated facts, 5 6 5 it was protected by the New York

and Federal Constitutions. 566 In reaching this conclusion, the
court stated that under both the New York State and Federal
Constitutions,

"such

opinions

are absolutely

protected." '5 6 7

Moreover, the court stated that even if the privilege of fair
564. Id.
565. See, e.g., Brian v. Richardson, 211 A.D.2d 413, 413, 621 N.Y.S.2d
48, 49 (1st Dep't 1995) (stating that an opinion which is based upon stated
facts is not actionable because the basis for the formation of such hypothesis is
likely to be understood by the audience); Rothman v. Sternberg, 207 A.D.2d
438, 439, 615 N.Y.S.2d 748, 750 (2d Dep't 1994) (holding that in determining
whether an opinion is actionable, the key issue to determine is whether the
statements reasonably appear to contain assertions of objective fact); Hollander
v. Clayton, 145 A.D.2d 605, 606, 536 N.Y.S.2d 790, 791-92 (2d Dep't 1988)
(finding that statements made by defendant at a professional staff meeting
constituted non-actionable opinion because the statements were ambiguous,
could not be characterized as true or false and were accepted by the audience
as opinion rather than as fact); Wehringer v. Newman, 60 A.D.2d 385, 390,
400 N.Y.S.2d 533, 536 (1st Dep't 1978) (stating that "[o]pinions, false or not,
libelous or not, are constitutionally protected and may not be the subject of
private damage actions, provided that the facts supporting the opinions are set
forth"); see also Held v. Pokorny, 583 F. Supp. 1038, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(stating that an expression of opinion cannot be subjected to the test of truth or
falsity and is, therefore, entitled to protection from liability under the First
Amendment).
566. Elite Funding Corp., 165 Misc. 2d at 502, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 615. See
Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 239, 567 N.E.2d 1270,
1271, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, 907 (concluding that statements of opinion are
entitled to the absolute protection of both the state and federal constitutional
free speech guarantees), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991); Rappaport v. VV
Pub. Corp., 163 Misc. 2d 1, 8, 618 N.Y.S.2d 746, 750 (Sup. Ct. New York
County 1994) (stating that under both the New York and Federal Constitutions,
only those publications which may be found to state or imply facts about the
plaintiff which are provable as true or false are actionable).
567. Elite Funding Corp., 165 Misc. 2d at 502, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 615.
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comment is said to be a qualified one, the plaintiff would have to
establish evidence of malice on the part of the defendant. 568 The
court held that the plaintiff failed to produce evidentiary facts
sufficient to support a showing of malice by the Bureau. 569

568. Id. at 502-03, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 614.

569. Id.
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